Paid subscribers will be able to download the complete match-event spreadsheet in XLSX format at the end of this article. The spreadsheet contains the event-level actions behind this Atletico Madrid vs Real Madrid tactical analysis and can be used for independent modelling, visualisation and deeper football-data research.
Data disclaimer: No match images or video footage were used in this analysis. The conclusions are based exclusively on event-level match data and derived tactical information including pass-network structure, xT progression, player centralities, defensive influence and event-derived positional tendencies. These movement patterns come from event data, not tracking data, so they describe functional changes in where players passed, received and connected rather than continuous physical trajectories.
Atletico Madrid won 2–1 in La Liga 2026/27 after a scoreless first half, with all three goals arriving after the break. The result itself was important, but the deeper story lies in the contrast between two passing structures: Atletico generated considerably more positive threat from their possession, while Real Madrid’s network relied heavily on deeper structural players and became even more conservative after going down to ten men.
Atletico Madrid 2–1 Real Madrid analysis inside the Football Hacking Web App
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The opening phase: Atletico stretch the right, Real Madrid load the left
Atletico’s opening structure already contained the asymmetry that would remain important throughout the match. Giuliano Simeone operated as an advanced reference in the right corridor, while Lee Kang-In repeatedly occupied the inside-right channel behind him; the relationship gave Atletico both external width and an interior passing option without asking the same player to perform both functions. Early event locations show Atletico repeatedly circulating and recovering the ball on that right side, rather than treating the flank as a simple crossing zone.
Real Madrid’s occupation leaned in the opposite direction. Marc Cucurella gave the team a wide left outlet from a deeper base, while the attacking structure repeatedly placed advanced players ahead of him in the same broad side of the pitch, creating a clear left-sided emphasis rather than a perfectly symmetrical build-up.
That mattered because Atletico did not need to dominate every zone equally. They could preserve their own right-sided combinations while forcing Real to circulate around a more predictable left-heavy structure, and the first half gradually became a contest over where possession could be converted into genuine progression rather than simply who completed more passes.
22.5’–HT: Atletico begin moving inside rather than simply outside
The second part of the first half produced a subtle positional change. Alejandro Grimaldo, initially much closer to the left touchline in the event-derived positioning, began appearing more often inside the left half-space, while Álex Baena also shifted toward more central areas rather than remaining permanently attached to one external corridor.
That inward movement created a different relationship with Atletico’s aggressive right side. Instead of building two independent flanks, Atletico could use one side to attract pressure and then access the opposite interior or corridor, an idea that is also visible in the progression routes: when Atletico began sequences centrally, 66.7% of those sequences reached the final third through the left corridor, while right-corridor starts also reached the opposite left corridor in 66.7% of the recorded sequences.
Real Madrid’s own interior structure dropped somewhat deeper as the first half developed. Jude Bellingham became more involved from central-left positions rather than only operating close to the last line, while Arda Güler increasingly participated from the right half-space at a lower height.
The result was a first half in which Real retained routes through midfield but did not establish the same relationship between circulation and threat. The difference would become much clearer after the interval, when the match suddenly shifted from positional competition to adaptation under numerical inequality.
The decisive sequence: red card, penalty and a completely different match
The central turning point arrived shortly after half-time. Dean Huijsen committed the penalty foul, was subsequently shown a red card, and Alejandro Grimaldo converted the resulting penalty to put Atletico ahead; the sequence changed both the score and the structural conditions of the match within only a few minutes.
The red card is particularly important for interpreting everything that followed. Any second-half network analysis that ignores the numerical disadvantage risks treating Real Madrid’s deeper structure as an ordinary tactical preference, when in reality the team now had to protect larger spaces with fewer players while simultaneously chasing the game.
Atletico reacted by increasing occupation around Real’s reduced block rather than simply circulating horizontally. Koke, introduced at half-time, immediately became an important connector in the right-central area, while Marcos Llorente continued linking the right corridor and right half-space, giving Atletico two different ways to access the same side without occupying identical spaces.
45’–67.5’: width outside, control inside
The most productive phase of Atletico’s attacking structure came after the interval. Grimaldo again pushed much higher in the left corridor, while Giuliano Simeone maintained aggressive width on the right, forcing ten-man Real Madrid to defend the full horizontal dimension of the pitch rather than collapse exclusively around the penalty area.
That outside occupation created room for the interior circulation. Atletico’s underlying passing model finished with 551 analysed passes, +1.31 total net xT progression and 0.71 xT per 100 passes, while their attacking-third phase alone produced more than +1.02 net xT. The important point is not merely that Atletico passed more, but that those passes collectively moved possession toward more threatening zones rather than repeatedly destroying value.
The second goal illustrated the value of that width. Giuliano Simeone delivered the decisive cross from the right side and Jonathan David finished first time from the centre of the box, doubling Atletico’s lead only a few minutes after the penalty and converting the right-corridor occupation into a direct central chance.
For Real Madrid, the positional response was almost the opposite. Cucurella dropped into a substantially deeper left-sided position after the red card, while Bellingham also became more involved from deeper central-left zones, reflecting the need to reconnect a team whose first line had lost one of its major structural players.
Centrality explains why Atletico’s possession travelled better
Atletico’s centrality profile gives the clearest statistical explanation for their structure. Marcos Llorente recorded the team’s highest Load Centrality at 0.281 and highest PageRank at 0.131, meaning he was both heavily involved in important routes through the network and repeatedly selected as an influential destination.
Koke provided a complementary profile despite playing only the second half. His Load Centrality reached 0.248 and his PageRank 0.112, an unusually strong influence considering his reduced minutes, which fits the immediate change in Atletico’s circulation after the break: the ball had a stable interior connector without removing Llorente’s right-sided influence.
This balance is important because centrality is not simply a ranking of who touched the ball most. Load identifies players who carry a larger share of meaningful network routes, while PageRank highlights players who become influential receiving targets; Atletico’s main hubs were therefore situated in areas capable of connecting build-up, half-spaces and advanced corridors.
Real Madrid’s network was concentrated much deeper
Real Madrid’s highest Load Centrality belonged to Marc Cucurella at 0.396, while Dean Huijsen reached 0.341 before his dismissal. Cucurella’s PageRank was also high at 0.120, showing how heavily Real relied on the left-sided defensive structure to maintain connectivity rather than establishing the same degree of central influence higher up the pitch.
The next structural reference was Ibrahima Konaté, whose PageRank of 0.129 was actually Real Madrid’s highest and whose Load Centrality reached 0.297. That gives the network a very different character from Atletico’s: Real’s major hubs were concentrated in deeper defensive positions, so much of the team’s circulation had to travel through the back line before it could reach attacking players.
Real were also more dependent on a narrow set of Load hubs. Their top three players accounted for roughly 77% of total Load Centrality, compared with about 59% for Atletico, indicating a network in which progression responsibility was much more concentrated.
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Similar network density, very different network value
One of the most interesting findings is that the difference cannot be explained simply by network density. Atletico’s passing graph had an edge density of 0.604, while Real Madrid’s was 0.600; structurally, both teams maintained a broadly connected network.
The bigger separation came from reciprocity and progression. Atletico’s reciprocity reached 0.841 compared with Real’s 0.730, indicating more consistent two-way relationships between connected players, but the much more important distinction was what happened to possession after those connections were established.
Atletico generated 0.71 xT per 100 passes, while Real Madrid finished at only 0.44. Real’s overall net passing progression remained slightly positive, but their final-third passing finished at -0.080 net xT, whereas Atletico generated +1.029 in the same broad phase of possession.
That contrast is huge tactically. Atletico’s passes near goal tended to preserve or increase attacking value; Real Madrid could reach advanced zones, but the next action often moved the ball toward a less threatening state, a classic example of why final-third possession should never automatically be equated with final-third danger.
Real Madrid’s corridor progression became fragmented
Real Madrid still found some progression from the left corridor. Around 42.9% of their sequences beginning there also reached the final third through the same corridor, while another 28.6% moved from the left toward the central corridor, showing that the left side remained their clearest launching platform.
But the distribution elsewhere was fragmented. Right-corridor starts were split equally between central, left-half-space and right-half-space destinations, while left-half-space starts were divided across four different final-third zones; variability can be positive, but in this match it did not correspond to sustained xT creation.
Atletico’s progression had a clearer relationship between origin and target. Right-half-space possessions most frequently reached the right corridor, while central possessions strongly favoured an exit toward the left, allowing the team to alternate between same-side continuation and diagonal transfer rather than circulating without a clear destination.
Atletico’s defensive influence also mattered
The attacking numbers tell only part of the story. Atletico recorded a defensive influence score of 0.717, compared with Real Madrid’s 0.622, and their most influential defensive zones included the central defensive third and the left half-space.
When Atletico defended those central and left-sided areas, Real Madrid frequently lost rhythm or were forced into recirculation rather than progressing immediately. This is especially relevant because those were precisely the zones from which Real were trying to reconnect their left-heavy structure with central attacking players.
Real Madrid also created disruption with their own higher pressure, especially through central areas in Atletico’s half, but Atletico were generally better at surviving those moments and restarting possession. The defensive data describes several Real pressure zones that caused recirculation, yet Atletico’s superior final-third progression suggests those disruptions rarely became sustained territorial control.
67.5’+: Atletico protect the centre and preserve outlets
The final phase produced another positional change from Atletico. Marcos Llorente dropped into a noticeably deeper position on the right side, while Ademola Lookman became a much higher outlet on the opposite left corridor, giving Atletico a way to protect the lead without removing all depth from their counterattacking structure.
Real Madrid responded by pushing new players into advanced zones. Yan Diomande occupied a high left-sided position, while Bernardo Silva increasingly connected from a more central-right area, giving Real a fresher route around Atletico’s compact block rather than simply repeating the first-half structure.
Real eventually reduced the deficit from a set piece. Bernardo Silva delivered the free-kick cross and Antonio Rüdiger headed home from the centre of the box late in the match, but the goal arrived too late to overturn Atletico’s structural advantage.
Final takeaway: Atletico won the battle between circulation and threat
Atletico Madrid 2–1 Real Madrid was not simply a story about the red card, even though Huijsen’s dismissal was the event that radically changed the second half. Atletico had already built a more reciprocal network and a clearer relationship between central circulation, right-sided occupation and opposite-side progression; the numerical advantage then amplified structures that were already functioning.
The centralities are especially revealing. Atletico’s main influence ran through Llorente and Koke in midfield and the half-spaces, while Real Madrid’s strongest network influence was concentrated around Cucurella, Huijsen and Konaté deeper in the structure; one team’s hubs were positioned to connect possession with attacking zones, while the other relied much more heavily on players responsible for getting the ball out of the first line.
The xT numbers complete the picture. Atletico generated significantly more threat per 100 passes, produced strongly positive value in the final third and maintained useful width throughout the second half, while Real’s final-third circulation actually lost net xT despite their late push.
For tactical analysis, that is the main lesson from this Madrid derby: connectivity alone does not define control. The decisive question is where the network’s most influential players operate, how the structure changes across match phases, and whether possession increases or decreases the threat of the next action.
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