This tactical analysis combines Football Hacking event data with a detailed tactical review of three Como matches: Napoli vs Como, Genoa vs Como and Como vs Parma. Rather than treating them as three isolated match reports, the objective is to identify the recurring behaviours that survive different opponents, pressing structures and game states — the principles that help explain how Como play. Paid subscribers will also find, at the end of the article, an XLSX spreadsheet containing the event data from all three matches, allowing the sequences discussed here to be explored independently. The sample covers three different tactical problems and three Como victories: 2–1 against Napoli, 4–1 against Genoa and 2–1 against Parma.
Como’s main idea: manipulate the opponent before attacking the space
The most useful way to understand Como is not to begin with a formation. Their positional structure matters, but the more interesting principle is manipulation. Como repeatedly try to move the opponent before attacking the zone they actually want. Width is therefore not always the destination of possession; very often it is the bait. A pass toward the flank can attract the defensive block laterally, increase the distance between opponents and create a new central or opposite-side route. The same logic appears at different heights of the pitch: during first build-up, during progression and around the final third.
This explains why Como should not simply be described as a team that “looks for the middle”. Against Napoli, for example, they were perfectly willing to circulate or force possession toward the outside before reopening the centre. The important detail is the sequence: first alter the opponent’s position, then attack the space created by that alteration. The corridor-progression data reinforces that interpretation. Como sequences do not consistently begin and end in the same lane; possessions starting centrally, wide or in a half-space can reach the final third through another corridor altogether. Against Napoli, for instance, possessions beginning on the left reached the final third centrally or through the opposite half-space, while right-sided sequences also migrated toward central and left-sided zones.
One of the clearest video examples came in Como’s first goal against Napoli. Luis Milla initiated the sequence, Lucas da Cunha then played a 42-metre chipped long pass across the pitch toward Assane Diao, and Diao immediately connected inside for Martin Baturina, who had arrived centrally to finish. The event data records the movement from Milla to da Cunha, the long diagonal from da Cunha, Diao’s assist and Baturina’s finish from a central position.
That goal contains several recurring features of Como’s positional attack: the ball changes corridor, a wide player becomes the rupture option, and another attacking player compensates by attacking the central finishing zone. Space is not merely occupied; one movement creates the conditions for another movement elsewhere.
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Third-man combinations are a principle — not a dogma
Another recurring feature is Como’s use of the third-man principle. During build-up and progression, the obvious receiver is frequently not the real destination of the play. A player receives in order to connect with another player positioned beyond the immediate pressure, allowing Como to progress without asking the final receiver to receive directly from the original ball carrier. This is especially valuable when opponents close obvious vertical lanes: the third man changes the angle of progression before the defensive structure can fully adjust.
This behaviour is closely connected to another detail visible on video: Como players repeatedly try to become available on the blind side of the nearest defender. The player providing progression support is therefore not simply searching for an empty zone. He is trying to occupy a position where the opponent has difficulty controlling both the ball and the receiver simultaneously. If that blind-side player is not initially available, Como often use movement around the ball to create him.
However, Como are not doctrinaire about combination play. As the attack approaches the penalty area, there are moments when the team deliberately becomes more aggressive. The third-man mechanism can give way to what we can call a “space of force”: once a sufficiently dangerous space has been created, Como do not necessarily need another elegant combination. They may attack it immediately with a direct pass, run, cross, cut-back or shot.
That distinction matters. The third man is a method of creating advantage; it is not an obligation to continue combining when the advantage already exists. Como can patiently manufacture the opening and then become vertical when the probability of turning that opening into a shot increases. In that sense, their positional play is pragmatic rather than decorative.
